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ARGUMENT
1.

Introduction.

The appellee argues that this Court should affirm Judge Young's judgment based on
the following assertions:
1. The appeal is moot because Mr. Linnell has accepted a reduced payment
from the appellee in settlement of his claim to the marital estate, and the
parties subsequently executed and filed with the District Court a mutual
Satisfaction of Judgment that certifies that both parties have satisfied all
things ordered under the Decree of Divorce;
2. Mr. Linnell has allegedly failed to marshal the evidence on appeal;
3. Judge Young allegedly did not abuse his discretion in determining that Mr.
Linnell was voluntarily underemployed, and in imputing income to Mr.
Linnell for the purpose of calculating Mr. LinnelTs child support and alimony obligations;
4. Judge Young allegedly did not abuse his discretion in calculating the
amount of Mr. LinnelTs alimony obligation because, argues the Appellee,
the award is reasonable and supported by evidence in the record.
5. Judge Young allegedly did not abuse his discretion in dividing the marital
estate between the parties because, argues the appellee, the award of the
marital home to the appellee was reasonable and the property division was
equitable and supported by evidence in the record.
If this Court adopts the appellee's first argument, that the mutual Satisfaction
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of Judgment that the parties have executed and filed with the District Court renders
this appeal moot, then the Court need not consider the other issues raised by Mr.
LinnelTs appeal. However, because the appellee raises a number of arguments in the
alternative, Mr. Linnell will address each of the appellee's arguments.
2.

The appellee is correct in arguing that this appeal is technically moot because
the parties7 Satisfaction of Judgment completely, fully, and finally discharges
both parties from any further obligations under the Decree of Divorce.

2.1. A "satisfaction of judgment" is a complete discharge of all obligations under a
judgment.

A "satisfaction of judgment" is a "complete discharge of obligations under a judgment." See, Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black's Law Dictionary 1343 (7th ed. 1999). The
following description of a "satisfaction of judgment" is incisive:
Generally, a satisfaction of a judgment is the final act and end of a proceeding. Satisfaction implies or manifests an expression of finality as
to all questions of liability and damages involved in the litigation.
Once satisfaction occurs, further alteration or amendment of a judgment, when entered of record by the act of the parties, is prima facie
evidence that the creditor has received payment of the amount of the
judgment or its equivalent, and operates as an extinguishment of
judgment debt.
47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §1006, at 443 (1995).
Utah R. Civ. P. 58B governs the satisfaction of judgments in Utah. Rule 58B(d)
unambiguously states that "when a judgment shall have been satisfied . . . and such
satisfaction entered upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent
of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien."
Therefore, if a satisfaction of judgment states that all parties to an action have
satisfied all things ordered by a judgment, then the parties have satisfied the judgment and the judgment is discharged.
7

2.2. This appeal is moot if the parties' Satisfaction of Judgment is a complete, full,
and final discharge of all the obligations that both parties formerly had under
the Decree of Divorce.

The appellee argues that this appeal is moot. This appeal is moot, she argues, because of the following three indisputable facts: 1) pursuant to the Decree of Divorce,
Mr. Linnell has accepted payment of $100,000 from the appellee in satisfaction of his
claim of a much larger interest in the marital estate; 2) pursuant to the Decree of
Divorce, upon acceptance of the $100,000, Mr. Linnell quit-claimed his interest in
the marital home to the appellee; and 3) both parties having satisfied "all things
ordered by the District Court in the Decree of Divorce," the parties executed, and
filed with the District Court, a mutual Satisfaction of Judgment discharging each
other of all obligations under the Decree of Divorce. See, Brief of Appellee 7-8,
Addendum A.
As the appellee points out, the Utah Supreme Court has said: "If a judgment is
voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has
become moot and the right to appeal is waived." Jacobson Const v. St. Joseph High
Sch., 794 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), quoting Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142,
1143 (Utah 1973). Applying the facts and law outlined above, the appellee argues
that Mr. LinnelTs appeal of Judge Young's division of the marital estate is moot.
In addition, the appellee argues that Judge Young's awards of alimony and
child support are "inextricably intertwined" with his division of the marital estate,
and that all three of Judge Young's decisions are so "interwoven" that they cannot be
intelligently separated. See, Brief of Appellee at 8, citing, Robertson v. Gem Ins., Co.,
828 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Therefore, she argues, Mr. LinnelTs appeal of
8

Judge Young's award of alimony and child support is also moot. The appellee's
assertion that this appeal is technically moot is correct if the parties' Satisfaction of
Judgment completely, fully, and finally resolves this action.
2.3. The parties' Satisfaction of Judgment is a complete, full, and final discharge of
all the obligations that both parties formerly had under the Decree of Divorce.

Because an element of risk is inherent in the litigation process, it is not unusual for
litigants to attempt to resolve their differences after a notice of appeal has been filed.
Indeed, given the weakness of her position on appeal, it would be understandable
for the appellee to seek an informal and final resolution of her dispute with Mr.
Linnell. Thus, it is not surprising that after Mr. Linnell had filed his Notice of Appeal, counsel for the appellee approached Mr. LinnelTs counsel and said that the
appellee was prepared to pay Mr. Linnell $100,000 in satisfaction of his interest in
the marital estate and to execute and file with the District Court a mutual Satisfaction of Judgment once Mr. Linnell had quit-claimed his interest in the marital
residence to the appellee.
In fact, the appellee's suggestion about the execution and entry of her proposed
Satisfaction of Judgment made a great deal of sense for both parties. The appellee's
suggestion made sense for the appellee because she would avoid the very real risk
that this Court would reverse Judge Young's decision below, yet she would keep the
lion's share of the marital estate that would remain after paying Mr. Linnell
$100,000. It made sense for Mr. Linnell because, even though he would be giving up
his claim to a significant portion of the marital estate, he would also avoid the risk of
further litigation, and he would be relieved from paying alimony and child support
9

obligations. In short, by executing the mutual Satisfaction of Judgment, the parties
mutually agreed that the appellee could keep a disproportionately large share of the
marital estate as a full lump-sum payment of Mr. LinnelTs alimony and child support payments. Thus, through this compromise, each party conferred substantial
and valuable consideration upon the other party in order to reach a truly complete
divorce, financially as well as legally.
Therefore, Mr. Linnell accepted the appellee's proposal that the parties enter
into a mutual Satisfaction of Judgment that provides that "all things ordered by the
court in the Decree of Divorce have been satisfied by both parties..." (emphasis
added). The appellee correctly points out that Mr. Linnell, through his attorney,
executed the appellee's proposed form of Satisfaction of Judgment—in fact, after
drafting the appellee's Satisfaction of Judgment, the appellee's attorney personally
delivered her proposed Satisfaction of Judgment to Mr. LinnelTs counsel for his
execution, and then she filed the Satisfaction of Judgment with the District Court.
Of course, before filing the Satisfaction of Judgment with the District Court,
counsel for the appellee also executed the Satisfaction of Judgment, which satisfies
all things that both parties were ordered to do by the Decree of Divorce, including,
of course, the former requirement that Mr. Linnell make alimony and child support
payments to the appellee.
2.4. Even though this appeal may be technically moot, this Court should exercise
its discretion to hold that the parties' mutual Satisfaction of Judgment fully
discharges both parties from any further obligations under the Decree of Divorce.

Throughout this action, the appellee has had the benefit of the counsel of three
10

attorneys, one of whom has decades of experience. Under the guidance of her three
lawyers, the appellee intentionally decided to propose, draft, execute, and file a
mutual Satisfaction of Judgment that, as a matter of law, completely, fully, and
finally discharges Mr. Linnell from any further obligation under the Decree of
Divorce. Nonetheless, the appellee argues that the decision below was "fair and
equitable and well within the discretion of the Trial Court." Brief of Appellee, p. 18.
She argues that Judge Young's decision "was based on the evidence, reflected in the
Findings, and supported by established statutory and case law and should be affirmed." Id. Thus, although the appellee forcibly argues that this appeal is moot, she
seeks to have this Court affirm Judge Young's decision. This the Court cannot do—
as the appellee herself argues, the parties' mutual Satisfaction of Judgment has
forever concluded the action below.
Thus, this appeal presents issues of public import regarding the meaning and
effect of a satisfaction of judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 58B. The issues raised by
this appeal are of public import because our commerce depends, in a myriad of
ways, upon the finality of judgments that have been satisfied by the execution and
filing of a satisfaction of judgment. However, because a satisfaction of judgment
ordinarily is the "final act and end of a proceeding," the issues raised by this appeal
are uniquely capable of evading judicial review. Under these circumstances, and in
the interests of judicial economy, this Court can exercise its discretion to review
even a technically moot appeal. See, State of Utah v. C.K., 987 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah
Ct.App. 1999).
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This Court should exercise its discretion and determine not only that this
appeal is technically moot, but that it is moot because of the effect and meaning of the
parties' mutual Satisfaction ofJudgment, which completely, fully, and finally satisfies
all of the requirements imposed on both of the parties to this action.
Because the appellee has made other arguments in addition to her mootness
argument, Mr. Linnell now addresses the additional arguments.
3.

Judge Young's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are incorrect as a
matter of law because they fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 52(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that, in "all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury . . . the Court shall find the facts specially, and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon

" When he entered the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of law, Judge Young failed to comply with Rule 52(a) in two ways.
First, he did not himself make findings, preferring instead to allow the appellee to
draft the findings and to determine the language of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in whatever manner she saw fit. (R. 244, p. 10,1. 19-p. 11,1. 19) When a
court adopts, verbatim, the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by a
party, the findings and conclusions are "not worth the paper they are written on . . .
." See, J. Skelly Wright, Seminars for Newly Appointed United States District Judges
166 (1963), quoted in United States v. El Paso Nat Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 n.4
(1964). The Tenth Circuit, in particular, has viewed the verbatim adoption of partisan findings with a jaundiced eye:
Even though we may not summarily reject findings adopted verbatim,
we must view the challenged findings and the record as a whole with a
more critical eye to insure that the trial court has adequately per12

formed its judicial function
"(T)he greater the extent to which the
court's eventual decision reflects no independent work on its part, the
more careful we are obliged to be in our review."
Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe, 616 F.2d 464, 466-67 (10th Cir. 1980) (citations
omitted). See, also, Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge 57 (1980). The Supreme
Court of Utah has also questioned the propriety of a trial court's mechanical adoption of partisan findings and conclusions. Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1113
(Utah 1993).
Second, Judge Young failed to comply with Rule 52(a) because the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law do not contain the required "separate statement" of
conclusions of law. In Utah, it is reversible error for a trial court to fail to separate its
conclusions of law from its findings of fact. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635,
639 (Utah 1995). Judge Young's sole conclusion of law states: "To the extent the
foregoing Findings of Fact are also Conclusions of Law, the same are adopted herein
in all respects." (R. 136, p. 13) Judge Young's cryptic one sentence statement is
simply not the "separate statement" of the conclusions of law that Rule 52(a) requires.
Judge Young's failure to comply with Rule 52(a) is not mere harmless error. By
classifying all issues as purported "Findings of Fact," the appellee has succeeded in
shifting the standard of review from the standard of correctness that applies to
conclusions of law to the standards of "abuse of discretion" and "clear error."
Moreover, by conveniently disguising all of the issues as findings of fact, the appellee
can raise the inevitable argument that Mr. Linnell must marshal the evidence to
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challenge each and every issue contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. It is precisely this type of abuse that the unambiguous requirement of Rule
52(a) is intended to prevent.
Judge Young's selection of the applicable law in this case is itself a legal conclusion that is subject to this Court's review under the correctness standard. Wilde v.
Wilde, 969 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Hill v. Hill 968 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998). In reviewing Judge Young's selection of applicable law under the
correctness standard, this Court gives no special deference to the District Court.
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Wilde v. Wilde,
969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Rather, this Court decides the matter for
itself, and does not defer to the trial judge's determination of law. Yet Judge Young's
judgment in this case is effectively insulated if this Court allows the District Court to
phrase all of the issues in the case as issues of fact.
This Court reviews issues of law for correctness. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,
425 (Utah 1991). The issue of whether Judge Young's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to comply with Rule 52(a) is an issue of law. Thus, in deciding
whether Judge Young has complied with Rule 52(a), this Court must review apply
the "correctness" standard. A review of the findings and conclusions under the
correctness standard reveals that Judge Young's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are incorrect as a matter of law. Therefore, in the event that this Court does not
find that this action has been fully satisfied by the parties' mutual Satisfaction of
Judgment, this Court should reverse Judge Young's decision and remand this case

14

for findings of fact and conclusions of law that are consistent with Rule 52(a).
4.

Mr. Linnell has adequately marshaled the evidence regarding the findings of
fact that he challenges.

As indicated above, by cleverly crafting all of the issues as issues of fact, the appellee
is in a position to argue that this Court should affirm Judge Young's judgment
because Mr. Linnell has not satisfied the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence.
The appellee's argument that Mr. Linnell has not marshaled the evidence fails for
two reasons: 1) meaningful appellate review of Judge Young's findings is not possible because the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are so deficient that marshaling the evidence would be futile; and 2) Mr. Linnell has, in fact, made a satisfactory effort to marshal all of the evidence that is conceivably relevant to Judge
Young's judgment.
4.1. Mr. Linnell is not required to marshal the evidence because the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law are so deficient that marshaling the evidence
would be futile.

The appellee's argument that Mr. Linnell has not marshaled the evidence is not
surprising—the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the appellee drafted
are cleverly phrased so that all of the issues under review are presented as issues of
fact. Judge Young's failure to comply with Rule 52(a) in making separate findings of
fact and conclusions of law make it impossible to tell exactly what his legal reasoning
has been and which of his holdings are findings of fact, which holdings are conclusions of law, and which holdings are mixed questions of law and fact.
The question of what conclusions of law Judge Young actually reached is of
central importance to a party attempting to marshal the evidence that purportedly
15

supports those conclusions. Because Judge Young did not clearly state his conclusions of law it is virtually impossible for Mr. Linnell to marshal evidence supporting
the findings and conclusions. For example, as discussed at length in the Statement of
Facts section of Appellant's Brief, Judge Young could not have made the alimony
award if he had truly considered all of the mandatory factors in Utah Code §30-35(7) (a) (1999). The numbers simply do not support Judge Young's conclusions.
Because it is not clear what legal conclusions Judge Young reached in making the
alimony award, marshaling is reduced to an exercise in frustration and futility.
Because the parties lack sufficient financial resources to maintain their former
standard of living, Judge Young was required to go beyond merely considering the
parties' incomes when he determined Mr. Linnell's alimony obligations. He was
required to inquire "more fully into their financial situations" and to make an "indepth consideration of the parties' circumstances" in order to "equalize" the parties'
standards of living. Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Utah Ct. App.
1999). Judge Young did not undertake the required in-depth analysis, however.
Simply put, it would be futile for Mr. Linnell to attempt to marshal evidence that
does not exist in support of an analysis that Judge Young did not undertake.
It is well established that an appellant need not marshal the evidence where the
findings are legally deficient. Williamson at 1105; citing, Campbell v. Campbell, 896
P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Where, as here, a trial court's findings are
merely conclusory and do not contain enough detail to clearly show the evidence
upon which they are grounded, attempts to marshal are doomed to failure. Camp-
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bell at 638-39; Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Therefore, Mr. Linnell is not required to marshal the evidence supporting Judge
Young's findings.
4.2. Mr. Linnell has sufficiently marshaled the evidence.

The appellee's marshaling argument also fails because, notwithstanding the futility
of the task, Mr. Linnell has made a sufficient effort to marshal the evidence. The
marshaling requirement is essentially a two-step process. First, an appellant must list
all of the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. See, Tingey v. Christensen,
987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999); State ex re. T.J., 945 P.2d 158, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The appellant must
then show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision,
the evidence does not sufficiently support the findings. See, e.g., Child v. Gonda, 972
P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1998). Contrary to the assertions of the appellee, Mr. Linnell has
marshaled the evidence that could conceivably support Judge Young's findings. A
review of the "Statement of Facts" section of Appellant's Brief and the record on
appeal will reveal that Mr. Linnell has fulfilled any obligation that he has to marshal
the evidence, insofar as it is possible to do so given the nature of the findings in this
case.
5.

Judge Young's finding that Mr. Linnell was voluntarily underemployed for the
purpose of imputing income to him in calculating alimony and child support
obligations is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.

The appellee argues that Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell on the
grounds that he was voluntarily underemployed is a finding of fact that is adequately
supported by the evidence. In support of her argument, the appellee dwells on
17

income that Mr. Linnell had made in his job as a manager of Lawn Life, rather than
on an assessment of opportunities actually currently available to Mr. Linnell.
In addition, the appellee argues that Mr. Linnell is underemployed because he
has chosen to start a new business rather than to work for others at an income he is
capable of earning. Given the facts in the record, this assertion borders on the
outrageous. As the record clearly shows, the appellee initially opposed Mr. LinnelTs
idea of starting a new company because she knew that such a venture would require
Mr. Linnell to work the type of long grueling hours he had worked when he was an
employee of Lawn Life—twelve to fourteen hour days, seven days a week. (R241, p.
89, 1. 19—p. 90, 1. 10) The appellee also opposed the startup of a new company
because it would mean that Mr. Linnell would make less money. (Id. at p. 91,11. 3-

ID.
Nonetheless, after discussions about the venture, the appellee decided to support Mr. Linnell in starting up his own lawn care company. The appellee gave Mr.
Linnell her approval and support even though she knew it would mean that the
couple would experience financial hardship in the beginning. (Id. at R241, p. 91,11.
12-23). Only after discussing the matter fully with the appellee and only after obtaining her blessing did Mr. Linnell start Green Pointe Lawncare, Inc. in January
1997 seven months before the Appellee filed for divorce. (R242, p. 227,11. 1-6) Thus,
the undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates that the appellee had given the
new business venture her blessing, and that she had chosen to acquiesce in Mr.
LinnelTs startup venture and his choice of employment.

18

Under circumstances similar to Mr. LinnelTs current employment with his
start-up company, courts have refused to impute income to spouses on the grounds
that they are voluntarily underemployed. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 877 S.W.2d 131,
136-37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (trial court erred in imputing income where, before
separation, husband and wife agreed that husband would start a new business within
his area of expertise and continue to work in that business); In re Marriage of Schuster, 586 N.E.2d 1345, 1356 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (trial court erred in imputing income
for child support purposes to spouse who continued to work as a commodities
trader even though he was not financially successful where spouse had entered"'into
trading with the other spouse's consent and before separation); In re Marriage of
Hardy, 548 N.E.2d 139, 142 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (a spouse's employment layoff and
an attempt to become self-employed were not attempts to evade financial responsibilities); Roberts v. Roberts, 847 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (trial court did
not abuse its discretion by when it declined to impute income to husband greater
income than he was earning in self-employment" when husband's reasons for
becoming self-employed "were satisfactory to both husband and wife

").

In short, it was clear error and an abuse of discretion for Judge Young to find
that Mr. Linnell was voluntarily underemployed, and this Court should reverse
Judge Young's finding in that regard.
6.

Judge Young's division of the marital estate was clearly erroneous and an
abuse of discretion.

Judge Young was required to distribute the marital property in a fair, systematic
fashion. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d, 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Each party is
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presumed, as a matter of law, to be entitled to fifty percent of the marital property.
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 & n. 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hall v. Hall, at 1022.
In order to achieve an equal distribution of the parties' equity to the marital estate,
the marital residence can be sold. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 544 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). Moreover, an unequal division of marital property is only justified when the
trial court memorializes, "in commendably detailed findings," exceptional circumstances supporting an unequal distribution. Thomas v. Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep.
23,25 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Judge Young refused to divide the marital estate equitably, however. He found
that if "Petitioner were required to sell the family home, she would not be able to
find suitable housing for herself and the parties' five minor children with the net
proceeds available." There is simply no evidence in the record supporting this
finding. Indeed, the undisputed evidence, in the form of testimony from Mr. LinnelTs real estate expert, was that suitable alternatives are available. (R242, p. 285,1.
23-p. 287,1.10).
Judge Young's grossly unequal division of the marital estate in favor of the
appellee is simply not supported by the evidence, and is so contrary to established
Utah precedent as to be clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION

The parties have entered into a mutual Satisfaction of Judgment that they have filed
with the District Court, which has the effect of completely, fully, and finally resolving the parties' dispute. Although the plaintiff is correct that the mutual Satisfaction
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of Judgment renders this appeal technically moot, this Court should not simply
dismiss this appeal on grounds of mootness—because a finding of mootness would
necessarily involve a conclusion that the mutual Satisfaction of Judgment terminated this lawsuit, this Court should take the opportunity to affirmatively hold such
to be the case. If this Court determines that the mutual Satisfaction of Judgment has
somehow not completely, fully, and finally ended this action, then the Court should
hold that Judge Young's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to comply
with the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) and the findings and conclusions are
clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. On that basis, the Court should reverse
Judge Young's decision below and remand for further proceedings in compliance
with Utah law.
DATED April 12, 2000.

Richard L. King
^M
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
Dennis D. Linnell
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